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Our paper aims at telling the whole story where fair value accounting is concerned. Harsh criticism has 
been brought to this concept under current circumstances that motivated out research. Without arguing for 
fair value as something it is not, we briefly try to point some relevant aspect on the situation. The paper 
starts  on  a  conceptual  level,  looking  at  fair  value  through  regulator‟s  perspective,  and  further  more 
analyzes some aspects of the current financial crisis. Finding make us think about the past and maybe 
thinking twice before shooting the messenger, since fair value reflects losses, but it can not generate them.  
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1. Introduction 
Our paper intends to create a short overview on fair value as a standard of value in financial 
reporting.  We  can  argue  our  choice  starting  with  the  ongoing  shift  of  financial  reporting 
standards  for  listed  companies  towards  fair-valued-based  reporting,  notably  the  increasing 
importance of fair value as an accounting measurement attribute. Nevertheless, current events 
brought serious critics and opponents fighting to restrict the use of fair value within financial 
reporting. 
We should mention the critical event triggering the shift towards the fair value paradigm was the 
Savings-and-Loans (S&L) Crisis in the USA during the 1980‘s, which laid open the deficiencies 
of the prevalent reporting system based on the historical cost. It resulted in regulatory action by 
SEC, which among other thing advised the FASB to develop a standard on accounting for certain 
debt securities at their market value instead of amortized cost. Despite its limited scope, this 
initiative represented a major evolution in accounting though on the regulatory level (Arthur 
Wyatt refers to it as ―possibly the most significant initiative in accounting principles developed in 
over 50 years‖ (Wyatt, 1991), a notion emphasized by the testimony of SEC General Counsel 
James Doty to the US Senate, who made it clear that ‗the time has run out on ―once-upon-a-time 
accounting‖‗. 
Ever  since  the  mid-1980‘s,  the  US  Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board  (FASB)  and  the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) have systematically substituted market-based 
measures for cost-based measures. Starting out as a specific remedy for the inequities of the 
reporting model for certain financial instruments, fair value has manifested itself as the dominant 
measurement  paradigm  for  financial  instruments  and,  more  recently,  has  increasingly  been 
implemented for measurement of non-financial items. The cost and transaction-based reporting 
model  is  in  decline,  a  new  market  value  and  event-based  model  is  rising,  with  dramatic 
implications for the role and properties of balance sheet measurement and accounting income. 
Starting  out  as  a  special  regulation  for  certain  securities,  fair  value  measurement  was  soon 
identified as the most relevant attribute for financial instruments. 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) made a fundamental decision that fair value 
is the most relevant attribute for financial instruments (FASB, 2004, p. 8). Although the quoted 
market value is the prescribed measure of fair value, the FASB adopted the term ‗‗fair value‘‘ 
instead of market value to encompass estimated values for financial instruments that are not 1043 
 
traded in active markets. The decision to mandate fair value disclosures was made amidst a long-
standing debate between the advocates of fair value accounting and advocates of historical cost 
accounting. The basic premise underlying the FASB‘s decision is that fair value of financial 
assets and liabilities better enables investors, creditors and other users of financial statements to 
assess  the  consequences  of  an  entity‘s  investment  and  financing  strategies.  Advocates  of 
historical cost, on the other hand, point to the reduced reliability of fair value estimates relative to 
historical  cost.  Their  arguments  suggest  that  investors  would  be  reluctant  to  base  valuation 
decisions on the more subjective fair value estimates (Barth, 1994, p. 3). Given the FASB‘s 
stated long-term goal of having all financial assets and liabilities recognized in statements of 
financial position at fair value rather than at amounts based on historical cost, the purpose of this 
study is to test claims that fair value is more informative relative to historical cost. 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board and the International Accounting Standards Board 
(hereafter  FASB  and  IASB)  are  jointly  working  on  projects  examining  the  feasibility  of 
mandating recognition of essentially all financial assets and liabilities at fair value in the financial 
statements. In the United States, fair value recognition of financial assets and liabilities appears to 
enjoy the support the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereafter SEC). In a report prepared 
for a Congressional committee (SEC, 2005), the Office of the Chief Accountant of the SEC states 
two primary benefits of requiring fair value accounting for financial instruments.  
First, it would mitigate the use of accounting-motivated transaction structures designed to exploit 
opportunities for earnings management created by the current ―mixed-attribute‖ – part historical 
cost, part fair values – accounting model. For example, it would eliminate the incentive to use 
asset securitization as a means to recognize gains on sale of receivables or loans. Second, fair 
value accounting for all financial instruments would reduce the complexity of financial reporting 
arising from the mixed attributed model. For example, with all financial instruments measured at 
fair value, the hedge accounting model employed by the FASB‘s derivatives standard would all 
but be eliminated, making it unnecessary for investors to study the choices made by management 
to determine what basis of accounting is used for particular instruments, as well as the need for 
management to keep extensive records of hedging relationships. Nevertheless, as noted in the 
SEC report, there are costs as well associated with the application of fair value accounting. One 
key issue is whether fair values of financial statement items can be measured reliably, especially 
for those financial instruments for which active markets do not readily exist (erg specialized 
receivables  or  privately  placed  loans).  Both  the  FASB  and  IASB  state  in  their  Concepts 
statements that they consider the cost/benefit trade-off between relevance and reliability when 
assessing  how  best  to  measure  specific  accounting  amounts,  and  whether  measurement  is 
sufficiently  reliable  for  financial  statement  recognition.  A  cost  to  investors  of  fair  value 
measurement is that some or even many recognized financial instruments might not be measured 
with sufficient precision to help them assess adequately the firm‘s financial position and earnings 
potential.  This  reliability  cost  is  compounded  by  the  problem  that  in  the  absence  of  active 
markets for a particular financial instrument, management must estimate its fair value, which can 
be subject to discretion or manipulation. Assessing the costs and benefits of fair value accounting 
for financial reporting to investors and other financial statement users in particular reporting 
regimes is difficult.  
Opponents of fair value measurement, on the other hand, criticize the questionable reliability of 
fair value measures, especially for model-based estimates relying on management‘s expectations 
and projections. In particular, the implementation of fair value as a balance sheet measure is the 
subject of intense discussion and debate. The controversy regarding fair value accounting for 
financial instruments as recently highlighted by the rejection of IAS 39 (revised 2003) for full EU 
endorsement, illustrates both conceptual and technical issues involved. Apparently, the debate is 
far from resolved. 
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2. A standard setting body’s perspective 
Both FASB and IASB stress the capacity of market values to incorporate, in an efficient and 
virtually unbiased manner, market consensus expectation about future cash flows. Our analysis 
on fair value starts with the FASB because of its initiative in the field. The set of accounting 
standards available within the American referential around 2004 did not include a unique source 
of general guidance, valid in the attempt of defining and estimating fair value. The guidance that 
concerned fair value could be found mainly in a series of intersected and ―patched‖ accountancy 
standards, which referred to financial instruments. On the other side, the exiting accountancy 
standards showed an increasing level of the acceptance of fair value as attribute of evaluation (in 
comparison with the depreciation cost). Assuming that there is a high probability that future 
standards  will  include  evaluation  at  fair  value,  the  definition  of  this  concept  (fair  value)  as 
attribute of evaluation – accompanied by procedural guidance at the highest level, and concerning 
a consistent estimation of the concept – became a priority in the goal of the efficient application 
of already existing or new standards.  
The goal of this new standard was to assist the users of information provided through financial 
reports,  so  that  they  could  evaluate  more  appropriately  the  relevance  and  credibility  of  the 
estimations of fair value. The financial reports should also contain information about the data and 
models used to provide fair value estimations. The standard created by FASB in the autumn of 
2006, SFAS 157 - Fair Value Measurement seems, on one side, to judder the foundation of 
historic cost based evaluation, but, on the other side, appears harmless because it does not impose 
the use of fair value on a wide scale (Miller and Bahnson, 2007). In fact, the truth lies, as usual, 
somewhere in the middle, in the way that the standard acts both ways. 
Indeed, the new standard does not impose the use of fair value in situations other than the ones 
already mentioned by previous standards. However, SFAS 157 modifies the ‗status quo‘ in three 
essential ways. We refer here to the fact that the level concerning practical aspects is being 
raised, a new series of factors that must be considered is emerging.  These factors must be taken 
in consideration when those fair values already mentioned in existing GAAPs are evaluated, so 
that the evaluation process can disclose information that is more important. Another effect was 
that the introduction of SFAS 157 cleared the way for SFAS 159 - The Fair Value Option for 
Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities. SFAS 159 created the possibility for fair value to be 
introduced and used in new ways. Another merit of this standard was that it prepared the field of 
financial reporting for the new Conceptual Framework developed by FASB. We rely on these 
affirmations  and  on  the  preliminary  aspects  contained  in  the  (PV)  Objective  of  Financial 
Reporting and Qualitative Characteristics of Decision - Useful Financial Reporting Information, 
introduced in 2006 by the same FASB These stated that the fair value will be ultimately preferred 
as an evaluation attribute in financial reports (FASB, 2006). In this context, the introduction of 
SFAS 157, was meant to clarify and put things in order, is fully justified. 
It  is  thus  clear  that  the  objective  of  the  issuing  of  SFAS  157  is  to  bring  uniformity  and 
consistency  to  the  professional  literature,  and  to  accountancy  practice.  One  of  its  great 
contributions resides in the fact that it offered a real catalogue of situations in which fair value is 
used, and a standard annex presenting more than 60 cases in which fair value is valued and 
reported.  
The core component of SFAS 157 is the description of Fair Value Hierarchy (paragraphs 22-31), 
that identifies the priorities that management should respect when estimating fair value of assets 
and liabilities. This hierarchy describes the input data of evaluation methods, without specifying 
what models should be used. In fact, these inputs represent the assumptions that market agents 
would  use  when  evaluating  the  value  of  an  asset  or  a liability. They  can  be  represented  by 
―visible  inputs‖  and  by  invisible  ones  (invisible  inputs).  Visible  inputs  are  based  on  the 
information provided on the market – thus belonging to independent sources – while invisible 1045 
 
inputs represent the assumptions generated by the reporting entity, assumptions which would be 
used by the participants on the market to evaluate the respective asset. 
The estimation of fair value follows, in principle, a three-tier hierarchy. The preferred level (1) 
fair value estimates are those based on quoted prices for identical assets and liabilities, and are 
most  applicable  to  those assets  or  liabilities  that  are  actively  traded  (e.g.  trading  investment 
securities). Level 2 estimates are those based on quoted market prices of similar or related assets 
and liabilities. Level 3 estimates, the least preferred, are those based on company estimates, and 
should only be used if level 1 or 2 estimates are not available. With the emphasis on market 
prices, the FASB emphasizes that firms should base their estimates on market prices as model 
inputs  wherever  possible  (e.g.  use  of  equity  market  volatility  estimates  when  employing  the 
Black-Scholes valuation model to estimate the fair value of employee stock options). If other 
models employing market inputs are not available fair value estimates can be constructed using 
entity-supplied inputs (e.g. discounted cash flow estimates). The governing principle is primacy 
of market-based measures  – the refutable notion that market prices or market data are more 
informative and reliable than internal estimates. Not to forget that market prices represent the 
best estimate for fair value, if market conditions satisfy the fair value definition. The relevant 
―quality‖ of market prices is assessed because of the active market criterion, that is, regular 
trading of the item on a liquid market is required for the market price to qualify as an estimate of 
fair  value.  The  second  level  of  estimation  hierarchy  requires  considering  (modified)  market 
prices of comparable items, where comparability naturally refers to the cash flow profile. Only 
when such prices cannot be used either, marking-to-market fails and fair value is mandated to be 
estimated using internal estimates and calculations. This marking-to-model, the use of accepted, 
theoretically sound pricing methods, represents a technique of last resort. Ample guidance exists 
on  valuation  models  for  financial  instruments,  and  accepted  methods  can  be  found  in  the 
marketplace.  
After only 6 months from the appearance of SFAS 157, through the emission made by FSAB in 
February  2007  of  SFAS  159  The  Fair  Value  Option  for  Financial  Assets  and  Financial 
Liabilities, whose elaboration, adoption and implementation surely would have been harder to 
realize if the basis would not have been put through its predecessor. The good part of SFAS 159 
regards those innovative managers that will profit on the permissively of the standard like an 
occasion to increase voluntarily the quantity of information useful on the capital markets, through 
the  intermediation  of  the  offered  financial  information.  We  are  not  to  forget  though  the 
possibility of exploration of its flexibility in offering a false image over some of the financial 
assets  and  debts  of  the  entity,  as  a  negative  effect    of  the  managers‘  innovative  capacities, 
stimulated through the standard. The theory offers us though an answer when facing this danger, 
considering these efforts negatively oriented, with a great lack of ethics, and un-useful, due to the 
fact that, earlier or later, capital markets will impose the well deserved punishment through the 
diminution of the quoted prices and the increase in capital costs. It is not to neglect the necessity 
of developing some mechanisms of corporative governance meant to encourage honest financial 
reports and objective ones (Ronen, 2008). 
The  IASB  also  develops  an  International  Financial  Reporting  Standard  on  fair  value 
measurement, which is based on SFAS 157.  The sharp distinction of fair value and value in use 
clarifies that fair value measurement is not to include entity-specific competitive advantages, that 
is, no private skills and no private information. Given the gradual evolution of the fair value 
paradigm, its impact on current standards shall be summarized briefly. Currently, both US GAAP 
and IFRS require the disclosure of fair values for virtually all financial instruments (IFRS 7, 
SFAS  107).  Guidance  on  fair  value  accounting  for  financial  instruments  is  also  identical  in 
principle. IAS 39 and SFAS 115, 133 require trading securities and derivatives held for trading or 
as part of a fair value hedge to be measured at fair value with revaluation gains and losses taken 
directly to income. Available-for-sale securities are also carried at fair value, but gains beyond 1046 
 
the historical cost ceiling are recognized as other comprehensive income until realization. This 
recycling approach is also applied in accounting for derivatives that are part of a cash flow hedge. 
In both regimes, securities classified as held-to-maturity, non-securitized financial assets and 
obligations, except derivatives, are in principle accounted for at cost. This mixed model approach 
reflects standard setters‘ reluctance and affected parties‘ resistance to implementation of full fair 
value  accounting,  despite  the  tentative  consensus  on  its  conceptual  merits  especially  on  the 
relevance dimension. The IASB has taken a big step in this direction with the 2003 revision of 
IAS 39, which has introduced the ―fair value option‖ to designate any financial instrument as 
―measured at fair value through profit and loss‖ at inception. Objections especially from bank 
regulators, notably the European Central Bank, resulted in a partial endorsement by the EU only 
(―carve  out‖)  and  prompted  the  IASB  to  restrict  the  fair  value  option  to  areas  where  an 
accounting mismatch is eliminated. With the recent publication of SFAS 159 in February 2007, 
the  FASB  follows  suit  and  implements  a  similar,  yet  less  restrictive  fair  value  option.  The 
following figure shows a parallel of the main standards regarding
473 fair value, developed on 
time
474 by the two major accounting regulatory setting bodies, IASB and FASB: 
 
 
3. History repeating – what have we learned? 
We should never underestimate the fact that the capacity to achieve a true valuation is in fact the 
key to success in the domain of financial services, because in order to buy or sell a financial 
instrument, it is imperative to know its value. In addition, after one buys a financial asset or 
contracts a financial debt, valuation represents the key to success in risk management implied by 
this element, but also in reporting the created value, to the stakeholders. The credit crisis begun in 
2007 was the cause of the job loss of numerous financial directors, but also of the bankruptcy and 
selling of numerous financial institutions. In time, 2 great problems seemed to be the base of this 
crisis. On of these is represented by the methods used to determine the fair value for financial 
instruments that started from the mortgage credits and were furthermore structured through a 
more or less complex setting. The second problem is the lack of information flow necessary to be 
known by investors, lack that could stop even the best valuation technique from generating a 
significant level of accuracy. (Deventer, 2008). 
Derivative financial instruments such as those in CDO‘s category causes often significant losses 
to investors, but it has to be kept in mind that, by their nature, often they exist only with the goal 
that the companies that make their structure to sell them in trenches formed at a price greater than 
the cost of the collateral who is referred to. The investors who ignore this reality of possible 
losses resulted after the structure is done are too naïve for the CDO‘s market (Deventer, 2008). In 
fact, the most naives of these have been guiding just after the ratings of the trenches within 
CDO‘s and after they made acquisitions, without trying to obtain a confirmation of the fact that 
                                                       
473 Defining, allowing the utilization, soliciting the utilization or making other references to the fair value. 
474 Each standard is positioned at the date of the first apparition, without mentioning the following amendments, and 
the abrogated standards are correspondingly marked. 
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the price that was asked, represented a ―fair value‖ (Matis and Bonaci, 2008). Through this, they 
have practically chosen to ignore the fact that rating agencies are paid by the entity that realizes 
the securities structuring and that this could be in favour of a superior rating compared to the real 
level  of  the  implied  risk.  If  the  trenches  within  the  CDO‘s  wouldn‘t  have  gained  a  more 
favourable rating than the one it deserved, these structures would not have been able to produce 
money  through  grouping  some  titles  accessible  on  the  market  that  would  have  been  resold 
afterwards at a higher price under the form of trenches. Those investors that have participated 
within the CDO market, having been based only on the ratings offered by the rating agencies 
should be sanctioned correspondingly by the management of the entities that are directly implied 
in making the investment or even by regulation organisms on the market (Deventer 2008). 
We can state that the current financial crisis is due to the relaxations of the underwriting process 
within the credit market, and a far too high-accepted leverage in the last years for mortgage 
credits  offered  on  the  market  (Wallace,  2008).  These  factors  have  raised  significantly  the 
underwriting process risk, but it was not correctly valuated at the moment when the mortgage 
was issued. The mass process through which these credits have been transformed in shares that 
gave the investors the right to a part of the cash flow generated by these (assets securitization) 
didn‘t do anything except to exacerbate the problem, when the rating agencies, despite the raised 
risk, gave high scores to some similar derivatives having as a base mortgage credits. This has 
determined an excessive increase in the demand for such securities, supporting in this way the 
demand on the real estate market and determining the increase in prices over time. 
Nevertheless, fair value accounting within this process is just to capture the changes appeared in 
the  market  prices,  as  they  materialize  themselves.  Even  though  the  utilization  of  inadequate 
assuming in the initial valuation of the mortgages has surely contributed to mastering the actual 
problems, this represents finally an error of valuation and not a problem caused by the application 
of fair value accounting  per se. That which the fair value actually does is to bring the true 
dimension of these errors of valuation, in the eyes of the investors, in a short interval of time 
(Wallace, 2008). The main difference between the reflection of an asset at the fair value or at a 
depreciation cost is represented by the recognition of some unrealized losses or gains in the 
alternative of fair value. However, these losses or gains represent in fact changes in the value of 
future  generated  incomes  by  the  so-called  asset.  As  a  following,  coming  back  to  the  actual 
financial crisis, the losses that the banks are ought to confess under the option of fair value, 
captivates in fact the true impact (upon the present and future incomes) at considering a higher 
degree of underwriting the mortgage credits that had been already given. 
Despite all evidences proving how things happened and how the mechanism that created the 
crisis were created, fingers keep pointing toward fair value, but we should take a closer look at 
who are the ones pointing them. Since late September and the beginning of October 2008, Wall 
Street Journal published a series of articles that described how the banking industry is revolted 
against the fair value accounting, bringing a series of critics, the majority because these would 
impose to the banks to diminish the asset value within the balance sheet, at lower values as the 
ones showed on the market. It seams that the financial institutions militate for an elimination of 
the fair value, seen as a partial solution for the banking industry nuisances. Wall Street Journal 
presented a letter to the American Bankers Association – ABA, asking them that until the end of 
the third trimester to recognize that fair value is laced of significance within some liquid markets. 
However, considering the financial mechanisms previously presented, that state the major role 
the financial institutions had at the root of this financial crisis, can we still ―point out‖ towards 
fair  value?  Moreover,  much  more  than  this,  would  the  elimination  of  fair  value  lead  to  the 
solvency of the problems the financial institutions face? (Bonaci and Matis, 2008). 
Starting with the beginning of fair value as a concept and ending by defending it under current 
circumstances, we would just like to kindly ask you not to forget the tales of the past, the Enron 
collapse inevitably coming to our thoughts. At that time, the new fair value accounting paradigm 1048 
 
was progressively incorporated into the framework of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
to  serve  along  with  the  well-established  historical-cost  accounting,  but,  as  today,  the  Enron 
debacle involved misuses of both paradigms. Then was also an opportunity to argue against 
―mark-to-model‖ valuation, and even more to suggest the time of fair value accounting had not 
yet come (Barlev and Haddad, 2004). Enron used, to a large extent, level 3 and level 2 inputs for 
its external and internal reporting. Level 3 valuation was first used for energy contracts, then for 
trading activities generally and undertakings designated as ―merchant‘‖ investments, these fair 
values simultaneous being used to evaluate and compensate senior employees. As proven later, 
Enron‘s accountants (with Andersen‘s approval) used accounting devices to report cash flow 
from operations rather than financing and to otherwise cover up fair-value overstatements and 
losses  on  projects  undertaken  by  managers  whose  compensation  was  based  on  fair  values 
(Benston, 2006). Unfortunately, once again we find how we learn from history that we learn 
nothing from history, as George Bernard Shaw concluded. 
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